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This thesis investigates the effect of the proposed Surface Warfare Officer
Career Incentive Pay (SWOCEP) program on the voluntary separation behavior of
Navy surface warfare officers using an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL)
model. Data provided by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey CA on surface warfare officers are
used for this analysis. Multivariate probit models are estimated to predict the
effects of the proposed SWOCIP program on the voluntary retention rate of
surface warfare officers between six and ten years of service. These estimates are
used to calculate the costs and benefits of the SWOCIP program. This thesis finds
that the SWOCIP program would increase the voluntary retention rate by 2.62
percent in the sixth year of service and 1.16 percent in the seventh year of service.
The effect would decrease between eight and ten years of service. The calculated
savings in accessions are greater then the estimated bonus cost. These calculations
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The training of Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) by the United States
Navy is a significant investment in human capital. According to the Bureau of
Naval Personnel (BuPers), the average accession and training costs for SWOs in
1996 were approximately $99,903 for an officer before he or she reaches the fleet.
The unique and challenging shipboard environment requires at least two additional
years of "on-the-job" training before an officer attains the necessary skills to
qualify for an 1110 warfare specialty designation as a fully qualified SWO.
Despite the size of this investment, only about two-thirds of all SWOs extend their
careers beyond their initial minimum service requirement (MSR) of four to five
years. Additionally, only between 35 and 40 percent of all SWOs continue their
service to 10 years of service (YOS).
BuPers (Loeffler, 1996) estimates that the retention rate to 10 YOS for
SWOs averaged 37.5 percent for officers entering the fleet during the period
encompassed by fiscal years 1975 to 1984. Accession shortfalls during the late
1980s and underestimated participation in various manpower reduction programs
during the downsizing, such as the Variable Separation Incentive (VSI) and
Special Separation Bonus (SSB) programs, may have inadvertently resulted in
even lower retention rates of officers with between five and ten years of
commissioned service (YCS) in the Surface Warfare community. Bupers also
reported a 34 percent retention rate to 10 YOS for year groups 1982 to 1988,
attributed to higher numbers of personnel accepting voluntary separation
incentives during the downsizing between fiscal years 1991 and 1994. Although
this rate was adequate to meet department head requirements in the late 1990s, a
continuing downward trend could lead to manning shortfalls in the future.
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Furthermore, BuPers also reported that underestimated accession shortfalls for
year groups 1992 to 1994 would require above-average retention for those year
groups to meet department head billet requirements for fiscal years 2000 to 2002.
Department head requirements for FY2004 are expected to be 275 billets, and
division officer billets are expected to be approximately 600.
Officers between five and ten YCS are typically lieutenants or lieutenant
commanders who are serving or will soon serve as department heads onboard
surface navy vessels. With the supply of these officers originating in the Navy's
internal labor market, future manpower shortages could occur at the department
head level without the proper balance between accession and retention in the
Surface Warfare officer community. Currently, the surface warfare community is
the only major unrestricted line community that does not have a retention incentive
program. To reduce the likelihood of similar shortfalls while simultaneously
decreasing the number of accessions, the Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC) and Strategic Analysis Group (SAG) Corporation
have recommended implementation of a Surface Warfare Officer Career Incentive
Pay (SWOCIP) program to entice highly motivated and qualified division officers
to stay beyond their MSR and up to ten years of commissioned service (YCS), that
is between five and ten YCS (Mackin and Darling, 1996).
B. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER INCENTIVE PAY
(SWOCIP) PROGRAM
NPRDC has recommended the following eligibility requirements for a
SWOCIP program:
1. The officer must have completed his or her MSR;
2. The officer must have completed no less than five years of
commissioned service but no greater than eleven years of active
military service;
3. The officer must have completed SWO qualification and hold a
primary warfare designation of 1 1 10 (surface warfare officer):
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4. The officer must agree to serve to at least ten years of commissioned
service;
5. The officer can only apply for the bonus program within a three year
window after reaching five years of commissioned service.
Only the number of officers needed to fill department head billets would be
awarded bonuses. Officers selected to receive the bonus would receive between
$5,000 and $10,000 annually, with 50% of the bonus awarded as a lump sum at
the beginning of the contract and the remaining sum distributed by annual
payments over the course of the additional obligated service time. Thus, for a
$5,000 annual bonus, the participant with the minimum five years of
commissioned service would receive $12,500 as a lump sum in YOS 6, followed
by annual payments of $3,125 for years of service 7 through 10; for a $10,000
annual bonus, the officer would receive $25,000 the first year and $6,250 for the
four following years. As of this date (January 22, 1996) this program has been
approved by the Secretary of Defense and is currently under consideration by the
Chief ofNaval Personnel for implementation beginning in FY98.
Although activation of the program in FY98 appears imminent, studies
supporting the implementation of SWOCIP have noted that Utile information exists
on the predicted effects of the financial incentive on retention of SWOs. Mackin
and Darling (1996) used the 10.5 percent participation rate for the pay bonus for
nuclear-trained officers in a simple inventory projection model to estimated the
retention effects of SWOCIP, noting that no studies existed of non-nuclear SWO
retention behavior. The authors note that the lack of empirical evidence on the
participation rate promotes use of more conservative methods to measure the
voluntary retention behavior without attaching an obligation, implying that an
ACOL model might be used for this analysis.
C. PURPOSE OF THESIS
This thesis will develop a statistical model to investigate the relationship
between the cost of leaving and the voluntary retention decisions of SWOs who
began commissioned service in FY 76. Using the Annualized Cost of Leaving
(ACOL) framework, this model will be used to evaluate the potential effectiveness
of SWOCIP on SWO retention rates.
The remainder of the thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter II
presents the analytic framework of the ACOL model, reviews applicable literature,
and discusses whether or not the ACOL model is appropriate for analyzing
voluntary separation behavior. Chapter HI describes the methodology and
describes the data used for this analysis. Chapter IV details the results of the
model and estimates the effect of the SWOCIP program on the retention decision.
The results of this research are summarized in Chapter V.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary concern of this thesis is to statistically estimate the effect of
the proposed SWOCIP program upon the surface warfare officer retention rate.
Specific issues include:
1. Will the proposed SWOCIP program increase the retention of
surface warfare division officers?
2. What will be the magnitude of the retention effect?
3. Will the improvement in retention warrant the cost of the program?
H. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING FRAMEWORK
Warner and Goldberg (1984) developed the Annualized Cost of Leaving
(ACOL) econometric model to predict whether or not an individual will stay or
leave after he has completed his obligated service. This framework assumes that
individuals seek to maximize their utility by comparing the cost and benefits to
them of each career decision they make, considering both monetary and non-
pecuniary returns. When an individual is deciding upon whether to remain in the
military or join the civilian work force, the model assumes he balances the
anticipated cost and benefits of the alternatives (staying in the military versus
leaving immediately) over each possible future period n of military service, where
n = 1,2,. ..,5 where s represents the maximum allowable future periods of service.
Warner and Goldberg assumed that all personnel are mandatorily retired at various
points between 20 and 30 years of service, depending upon the rank of the
individual.
Warner and Goldberg's model utilized the following definitions:
Mj = expected military pay in each future year of service, J= l,...,s
Rjn - yearly retired pay to be received after n more years of service,
j=n+l,...,T where T equals additional life expectancy
Wjo = future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive
if he leaves the military immediately, j= 1,...,T
Wjn = future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive
if he leaves the military after n more years of service,
j=n+l,...,T
p = individual's yearly discount rate
(l/l+pj = the present value of a dollar received j years in the future, at
the time of the retention decision, wherey=l,...,r
Ym = annual monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary aspects of
military life
yc = annual monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary aspects of
civilian life
The model assumed the values of ym and yc to be fixed over time for
individuals but normally distributed across individuals.
Drawing on the derivation of the empirical model contained in Rogge
(1996), we first not that the utility of staying in the military through year n is
greater than the utility of leaving immediately only if:
where the first summation on the left-hand side is the present value of military pay
plus the "taste" for military life over n more years of military service. The second
summation represents the present value of retirement pay after rnilitary service
plus civilian pay after military service until the individual dies. The right-hand
side summation is the present value of civilian pay plus the "taste" for the civilian
work force if the individual immediately leaves the service.
This condition for staying in the military can also be represented as:
" M T R +W T W » i




where C„ is the cost of leaving and 8 is the net preference (yc-7m) for civilian over
military employment. 5 can be thought of as the amount the individual would be
willing to pay each year to be employed in the civilian work force and not be
employed by the military, assuming the annual civilian and military compensation
were the same (Hogan and Black, 1991).
Dividing both sides of the equation by
^ 1
7W +pY
the condition for staying in the military becomes:
" A 1_ (4)
for some n, where A„ is the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) after n more
years of service.
This analytic framework assumes that an individual prefers a strategy of
staying in the military for n more years to one of leaving immediately only if the
ACOL exceeds the net preference for civilian life (An>$). Or, an individual will
choose a strategy of leaving immediately to any strategy that involves staying in
the military only if A„<5 for all n = l,...s. This is equivalent to finding the
maximum difference between military pay and the best alternative for horizon s, or
condition max. An < 5 (Hogan, 1995). If this maximum difference would not be
adequate to keep an individual in the military, neither would lesser values. Thus,
the relevant ACOL value for the retention decision is the maximum over the set
(Ai...As) and the relevant time period for the decision is the one over which the
ACOL value is maximized.
The retention decision can be modeled using binomial probit analysis:
Z,=^+^Xh+ fi2X2t (5)
where Zt is a standardized indicator variable reflecting the retention, the Xs are
typical independent variables, the |3s are regression coefficients. Assuming that
the net tastes for civilian employment are normally distributed N(n,a2) where p. is
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individual /. If we let po = -uAr and pi = 1/a, and account for a vector of







>di ) = JN(0,\)dz
(7)
Warner and Goldberg computed the expected military pay stream using
promotion probabilities by years of service (YOS) and pay grade for enlisted
personnel who left the Navy after completion of one term of service. Earnings
after completion of military service were estimated utilizing an earnings function
with linear and quadratic terms for years of post-military experience, branch of
service, race, education and other demographic variables. In their retention
models for 16 Navy enlisted occupation codes, Warner and Goldberg discovered
"that variation in ACOL explains much of the variation in the probability of
reenlisting." They found that for most service members at their first term
reenlistment point the maximum An is found over the horizon of a four-year
reenlistment. The only conditions where the optimal horizon was as long as 20
years was when the personal discount rate was 10 percent or lower without a
reenlistment bonus program. Furthermore, married personnel reenlisted at a higher
rate than single personnel. This was attributed to the greater value of non-
monetary benefits available to married personnel, especially health care benefits
for family members.
Additional research on the retention decision supported the importance of
the economic factors modeled in ACOL. Smith et al (1991) created econometric
models of first- and second-term reenlistment decisions by Army enlisted
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personnel. The authors used age-earnings profiles to estimate the civilian pay
stream to age 65 and promotion time models calculate the future military pay
stream utilizing the ACOL-2 model, which separates unobserved factors into fixed
taste (St )and random term or one-factor variance ($,) components (Hogan and
Black, 1991). The reenlistment decision rule can be written as:
ACOLlt +St +sit>0 (8)
ACOL-2 accounts for heterogeneity in the taste terms whereas the ACOL
empirical specification only includes the fixed taste term and does not control as
well for self-selection.
Smith et al (1991) found that the maximum value of ACOL occurs at both
the first- and second-term decision points when the values were calculated for a 20
year horizon. Smith et al also found that being a minority, being female, in
addition to the ACOL variable increased the reenlistment probability. The number
of dependents positively affected retention behavior, consistent with Warner and
Goldberg's study. AFQT scores had mixed results on the retention decision:
scores increased the retention rate in four out of the six regressions, but decreased
it significantly in the remaining two. This is not surprising, as some other studies
have found that higher quality personnel positively influence the reenlistment
probabilities (Daula and Baldwin, 1986) while others have found a negative
relationship between AFQT scores and the reenlistment rate (Black et al, 1987).
Daula and Moffitt (1995) developed a comparison of the ACOL to dynamic
programming models of first- and second-term reenlistment decisions, finding that
the two types give approximately the same fit. These findings duplicate Smith et
al (1991) in their effects of race, AFQT score and the number of dependents upon
the retention decision.
Whereas most of the aforementioned studies focused on the retention
decision of more junior enlisted personnel, Goldberg (1982) analyzed effect of
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military pay on retention rates of third-term Navy enlisted personnel. This
typically involved service members with lengths of service between 11 and 14
years of service who were eligible to make voluntary reenlistment decisions. He
used a 20-year decision horizon, assuming third-termers either left the Navy
immediately or reenlisted and stayed until 20 YOS; historically, reenlistment rates
climb extremely high with increasing lengths of service because of the increasing
attractiveness of the military retirement system with more YOS. Goldberg
specified logit regression models for nine different occupational groups with
ACOL as the only explanatory variable. Coefficients for all models were
significant.
Black et al (1990) studied the separation behavior of federal civilian
employees not bound by contracts by using an "Annualized Cost of Staying"
approach instead of the Annualized Cost of Leaving. The authors concluded that
increases in compensation significantly improve retention of federal civilian DoD
employees, that females are more likely to leave their jobs than males, and that
blacks are less likely to quit than whites.
The ACOL model can also be applied to officer retention models if it is
modified to reflect the differences in the decision horizon applicable to between
officer and enlisted communities. Whereas enlisted personnel reenlist for a fixed
number of years specified in their contract (normally two to four years), officers
are required to complete a minimum service requirement based upon their
commissioning source and then serve from year to year. For example, Naval
Academy graduates are required to serve five years after receiving their
commission, and graduates from other commissioning sources are required to
serve four years.
Mairs et al (1992) conducted one of the few analyses on military officer
retention behavior, in which the authors developed a two-decision ACOL-2
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retention model of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officer personnel. They specified
two 3-year decision windows and utilized a probit regression model including
dummy variables for marital status, gender and race. They found that ACOL had a
significant, positive effect upon the voluntary retention decision. Married and
female personnel tended to stay in the military (duplicating Smith et al's (1991)
results) while ethnic minorities were less likely to continue service.
Additional ACOL retention models support the significance of ACOL on
the officer retention decision. Reibel (1996) found ACOL to significantly and
positively affect the retention decision of naval aviators, as did marital status and
the number of dependents; being an ethnic minority did not significantly affect this
decision. Rogge (1996) also found ACOL to be significant and positive in the
retention decisions of Naval officers eligible to receive the Voluntary Separation
Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Bonus (SSB) in the early 1990s. His study
paralleled the previously mentioned studies in the effect of marital, dependent, and
minority statuses upon the voluntary retention decision.
Not all studies utilizing the ACOL method have found the ACOL variable
to be significant. A Congressional Budget Office study of the bonus program for
nuclear-trained Navy officers found no significance between the annualized value
of income and the voluntary retention decision. The analysis contradicted the
aforementioned officer studies as it found ethnic minorities less likely to stay than
their white counterparts, but it supported the notion that the number of dependents
at the end of the MSR had a significant and positive effect upon the decision to
stay.
The great variety of questions analyzed using ACOL illustrates the broad
range of applications for this framework. ACOL, marital status, the number of
dependents and ethnic minority status appear to have a significant influence upon
reenlistment, retention and voluntary separation behavior.
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B. THE PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE
Warner and Pleeter (1995) define the personal discount rate (PDR) as "the
rate at which individual's trade current dollars for future dollars" and "the rate at
which an individual discounts money streams in decisions involving choices over
time." It is a critical factor in the calculation of the future earnings streams and in
the annualization of the difference of the two pay streams within the ACOL
framework. A higher individual PDR means a greater discount rate on future
earnings, such as retirement benefits. Numerous studies have focused on the
question of the officer PDR to estimate the effects of changes in the military
retirement system, since these benefits are considered a key factor in compensating
for the demands of military service and changes could affect the desirability of the
military as a career choice. However, this past research has been far from
conclusive.
Nord and Schmitz (1985) examined a wide variety of past research in their
study to assess the PDR. Table 2.1 summarizes their results. Estimates of the
PDR vary from 1.2 to 39 percent, usually declining with age.
Table 2.1. Results of Selected Studies on the Personal Discount Rate (PDR)
Study Sample Group PDR (%
Friedman (1957) U.S. farm families 30
Landsberger (1971) Israeli consumers 9-27
Heckman(1976) U.S. consumers 18-20
Rosen (1976) U.S. male high school
and college graduates
7.2-8.7
Hausman(1979) 46 U.S. households 10-39
Leffler and Lindsay (1981) Medical School Applicants 10
Gilman(1976) Civilian Employees 1.2-24
Cylkeetal(1982) Navy enlisted personnel 16-20
Black (1983) Enlisted personnel, all services 12.5
Source: Nord and Schmitz (1985).
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Using the 1983 Army Research Institute (ARI) Exit Survey with an attached
group of questions, Nord and Schmitz conducted a direct assessment study to
derive their own PDR estimates. They administered the survey to soldiers in
paygrades E-3 to E-9 undergoing processing for a permanent change in station or
release from the Army. Their results infer that the PDR for the average soldier in
their sample to be approximately 14.2 percent.
Warner and Pleeter found that individuals do not discount all future values
at the same rate and that the PDR varies with personal characteristics. 1 They
reference Gilman (1976) who derived discount rates ranging from 8.5 percent for
older persons with high incomes to 16.2 percent for younger persons with lower
incomes. Warner and Pleeter also quote Black (1984) who estimated average
discount rates of officers and enlisted personnel to be 10.3 percent and 12.5
percent respectively. Additionally, Cylke et al (1982) stated that Navy enlisted
personnel have a PDR of about 17 percent. Applying Warner and Pleeter'
s
findings that officers have discount rates around 10 points lower than enlisted
personnel, Cylke et al imply that officers have PDRs of seven percent.
C. STUDIES OF THE EFFECT OF THE SWOCIP PROGRAM
At least one study tried to determine the effect of the SWOCIP program on
SWO retention behavior. Mackin and Darling (1996) analyzed the cost
effectiveness and retention effects of the program utilizing an inventory projection
model. They estimated the program "take" rates and pay elasticities using the
experience of the nuclear-trained officer bonus program. Their study estimated
that a $5,000 annual bonus would allow the Navy to access 67 fewer SWOs to
reach the desired endstrength of 275 at the end of 10 YCS, saving $18 million in
1 Although this study involves issues related to the federal government, the OMB A94 (1992) standard
discount rate of 7 percent (or the more conservative real borrowing rate, which varies from approximately
4-5 percent.) is inappropriate for studies which focus upon decisions made by individuals.
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training costs. A $10,000 bonus was estimated to decrease the required number of
accessions by 160 and save $50 million in training costs.
One weakness with the Mackin-Darling study is that it assumed that the
take rates for nuclear-trained officers would be the same as they would for SWOs
who are offered a retention bonus. This is questionable because the technical
skills and education nuclear-trained officers acquire through the training pipeline
may increase their market value to the civilian work force relative to the average
SWO. Hence, their cost of leaving under a similar bonus plan would be lower
than the average SWO. More important, the responsiveness of nuclear officers to
a given bonus program may differ from that of conventional SWOs.
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m. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA DESCRIPTION
Data on Surface Warfare Officers were obtained from the Center for Naval
Analyses and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey. The data
files compiled by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) contained information on
the demographics, years of service, and separation dates for SWOs who entered
naval service between FY 76 and FY 90. The initial data set consisted of 21,532
observations of SWOs and 90 variables. Observations for officers who had not
completed 5 years of service were removed from the working data set, ensuring
that remaining observations included only officers who had completed their MSR.
SWOs were then assigned to year groups (YG), or cohorts, according to the fiscal
year of their commission. Cohorts 76 through 78 were selected for analysis since
their retention behavior could be followed through ten years of service, the desired
end point for the prospective SWOCIP bonus. Officers who received their
commission before 20 years of service were deleted from the SWO data subset,
assuming that this variable was in error for these respective observations in the
data set. Officers who had been discharged from active service involuntarily also
were removed from the data set. Of the remaining 3,426 observations, 41 (or 1.2
percent) were female. The data subset for this analysis was restricted to male
SWOs to facilitate ACOL computation, discussed later in this chapter.
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics for the data set of male SWOs who
entered the Navy between 1976 and 1978. A t-test for differences in means for
each variable is shown in column 6. As can be seen, age, marital status, whether
or not an officer has children, and minority status are all statistically significant.
The average age at entry and percent married officers vary slightly across year
groups whereas the percent minority varies by nearly four percentage points from
15
year to year. The frequency of officers with children at 5 YOS drops steadily
across year groups in the sample. Although the percent married officers at 5 YOS
and percent with children at 5 YOS decline in the short term with the three
specified year groups shown above, averages of future year groups in the CNA
data set do not display a downward trend and maintain averages close to those
listed in column 2 of Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Mean Values of Selected Variables of Surface Warfare
Officers by Year Group
~_
YG?6 YG77 YG78 Mest
Observations
Age at commissioning
Married at 5 YOS (%)
Minority (%)
Children at 5 YOS (%)
3385 1147 1165 1073
23.14 23.05 23.28 23.09 .0001*
62.34 66.09 62.58 58.06 .0001*
8.75 6.71 10.56 8.95 .0001*
17.4 20.66 17.6 13.7 .0001*
* means for observations are significantly different at the .01 level of statistical significance
Source: Derived from data obtained from CNA.
Table 3.2 shows additional data regarding the retention decisions of
officers. Officers who left the military tended to receive their commission at a
younger age and also were less likely to be married at MSR, have children or be
minorities when compared with surface warfare officers who chose to remain in
the Navy.
Table 3.2. Mean Values of Selected Variables of Surface Warfare Officers
for Year Groups 76-78 by Voluntary Retention Decision
Stayers Leavers
Age 23.33 22.21
Married (%) 64.85 49.46
Children (%) 18.93 9.57
Minority (%) 9.04 7.22




The specification of the empirical model follows previous literature on the
ACOL model. Utility maximizing behavior is assumed to guide officers faced
with a career decision to stay in the military sector or leave to find civilian
employment. The ACOL model is then used to predict an individual's response to
a career incentive pay program. Most of the explanatory factors in previous
studies (presented in the literature review above) are assumed to be applicable to
the decision to accept career incentive pay and remain in the Navy. The surface
warfare officer retention model is specified utilizing equation (6) in Chapter II
with the probit indicator variable, Z,-, associated with staying in the military
expressed as a function ofACOL and other explanatory variables (X),
Z
t ^fi +filACOIi +Xi£ (9)
where Z, represents the standard indicator variable of staying for individual z,
ACOLi is the Annualized Cost of Leaving value for individual i, St is the
individual's net preference for civilian employment over military employment, A,
and Xj are the respective vectors of parameters and individual characteristics.
Individuals in the sample are assumed to have no obligated service commitments
between 5 to 10 YOS, meaning that they are free to make a voluntary retention
decision during each YOS.
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the dependent variables and the explanatory
variables used in this estimating model. These variables are assumed to
significantly affect the decision to stay in the military.
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Table 3.3. Definitions of Variables Used in the Probit Retention Models
Variable name Definition
STAY = if left the military between the 5 and 10 YOS
= 1 otherwise
ACOL Annualized Cost of Leaving ($)
MARRIED = lifmarriedat5 YOS
= otherwise
MINORITY = 1 if minority
= otherwise
CHILDREN = 1 if has dependents other than spouse at 5 YOS
= if no dependents other than spouse
Source: Data from DMDC, CNA and author.
2. Variable Construction and Definitions
a. The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable STAY was constructed from the TIMEJLOS
variable in the original data set. STAY was coded 1 if the individual did not leave
the military and coded if he separated within the 5 to 10 year "window."
Individual retention decisions for each YOS were accumulated for the 3385
officers in the sample, resulting in 15,281 individual decisions for the entire time
period. For example, if an individual in YOS 6 decided to stay in the military, his
intermediate dummy variable for staying in the military (STAY6) was coded = 1
.
If he decided to leave the military immediately, STAY6 was coded = and the
individual was deleted from the subset of "stayers" who made a decision in YOS
7. If he again decided to remain in the military, the dummy variable STAY7 was
coded = 1 and the individual was included in the subset of officers who made a
decision in YOS 8. Thus, officers who left the military were not included in
subsequent years of service.
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b. Calculation oftheACOL Variable
To calculate the value of the Annualized Cost of Leaving it is
assumed that individuals derive their expectations of future income streams from
current information about military pay and future promotion rates and civilian
wage opportunities. It can be assumed that the typical officer weighing his
retention decision during each of the years between 5 and 10 YOS in the absence
of a SWOCIP program planned on staying in the military until he was vested for
retirement benefits (i.e., until 20 YOS). The decision was, therefore, assumed to
be between leaving the military immediately or staying until 20 YOS (when the
individual is eligible for retirement benefits), using Goldberg's (1982) assumption
in his analysis of mid-career personnel that the max. ACOL will normally occur at
the 20-year service point, which is typically the earliest point the service member
can retire. Therefore, the values calculated for ACOL considered a 20-year
service point, the max. ACOL for the individual at the given decision point. For
each year in which an individual made a decision, this max. ACOL was computed
for the decision and included in the probit analysis.
To estimate the expected future military income stream, Navy
Officer Master Files (OMF) between FY77 and FY90 were obtained from Defense
Manpower Data Center in Monterey, CA. SWOs were sorted into year groups
based upon the fiscal year of their commission, then the paygrade distribution by
YOS was computed for each year group. Since the differences in this distribution
were small between year groups (differing by no more than 3 percent in a given
paygrade), an average of the paygrade distribution by YOS for all year groups in
this range was computed. Paygrade frequencies were rounded to the nearest whole
percent, and frequencies of less than 1 percent for a given YOS were assumed to
be atypical and omitted. Table 3.4 summarizes the resulting probabilities.
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Table 3.4. Average of Paygrade Frequencies by Years of Service,
Surface Warfare Officers (FY 77 to 94)













18 .04 .93 .03
19 .03 .93 .04
20 .02 .92 .06
Source: Derived from data obtained from DMDC.
The paygrade probabilities were combined with FY81 to FY87
military pay tables to calculate the expected monthly basic pay, Basic Allowance
for Quarters (BAQ) conditioned on dependent status, Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) deductions, and expected Career Sea Pay. Probabilities
for a change in marital status (i.e., becoming married) were computed for single
personnel by averaging such changes from OMFs 1977 through 1990 and applied
to the calculation for the expected BAQ. 2 Additionally, since Navy personnel
2 If P(L) is the proportion of the SWO community married at YOS=L, the probability of becoming
married at YOS=L+l can be approximated as (P(L+1)-P(L))/(1-P(L)).
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receive Career Sea Pay only when serving onboard afloat units, it was assumed
that this payment was received during YOS 8 through 11 and YOS 14 through 17
(an estimated sea-shore rotation for year groups 76, 77 and 78). These data were
combined to estimate the expected annual military income for each YOS.
Nominal values were converted to real values using 1990 as the base year in order
to keep the military and civilian pay streams at the same base year. Expected
future annual military retirement benefits were assumed to be 50 percent of the
expected annual military basic pay in YOS 20. The results of these calculations
are contained in Appendix A.
In calculating the ACOL values after the implementation of the
SWOCEP program, the bonus was included as part of military pay. It was assumed
that the $50,000 bonus would be paid similarly to current Aviation Career
Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP). Under these
programs, 50 percent of the bonus is paid in the first year with the remainder paid
in equal installments over the obligated service period. Thus, $25,000 was added
to the annual military basic pay for the first year and $6,250 was added for each of
the remaining four years of the commitment. The bonus was therefore included in
the mihtary pay stream and discounted along with the annual military basic pay in
computing the present value of the mihtary option.
The present value of the total military income stream associated with
staying until YOS 20 in the military can be estimated by suniming the discounted
values of annual military pay until YOS 20 and those of the military retirement
benefits from the age of retirement until the age of life expectancy, or 73 years of
age for men. Following Mairs et al (1992), Goldberg (1982), Warner and
Goldberg (1984) and Rogge (1996), a ten percent discount rate was chosen
throughout the analysis.
A civilian age-earnings profile was calculated using data from the
1990 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) with the assumption that a military
retiree will remain in the civilian labor force until 65 years of age. These data are
based on the census of the United States and contain records representative of 5
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percent or 1 percent samples of persons living in homes in the U.S. The PUMS
yielded 51,212 observations of military veterans. Controlling for levels of
education and receipt of military retirement benefits, the estimated age-earnings
profile gave approximations of the future civilian income and retirement benefits
stream of veterans. The total present value of the civilian income stream to be
expected after military retirement was calculated as the sum of the discounted
annual civilian pay from military retirement age until 65 years of age, plus the
discounted annual civilian retirement benefits from age 65 until the life expectancy
age. The present values of the military and civilian income streams were then
summed to estimate the individual's perceived monetary value of staying in the
military.
The same age-earnings profile was then used to calculate the
discounted annual expected civilian wage of military veterans with less than 20
YOS. Consistent with Goldberg and Warner (1987) and Rogge (1996), veterans
who leave the military before completing 20 YOS have higher discounted civilian
earnings than those who stay for 20 YOS. The anticipated value of the discounted
civilian income plus the discounted civilian retirement stream was determined by
discounting the individual's annual civilian earnings, conditioned on age, then
sunaming them from the current age until life expectancy to obtain the total present
returns if the individual left the military.
The cost of leaving (COL) was calculated for each individual as the
difference between the present value of staying until 20 YOS (or "returns to
staying") and the present value of leaving immediately (or "returns to leaving").
This can be written as:
COL; = RSj - RL, (10)
where COL, is the value of the cost of leaving for each individual at the time of
the decision, RSj is the value of the returns to staying in the military from the
decision point until 20 YOS, and RL
;
is the value of the returns to leaving the
military immediately. RL; consists of the summation of the discounted civilian
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pay stream from the decision point until life expectancy. RSj is composed of the
sum of the discounted military pay stream and the discounted civilian pay stream
after 20 YOS until life expectancy, or:
RSj = MILPAYi + CIVPAY, (11)
where MILPAYi is the discounted military pay stream and CIVPAYj is the
discounted civilian pay stream for individual i.
The COL values were annualized using the ten percent discount rate
to obtain the ACOL values. It is hypothesized that ACOL positively affects the
probability of staying in the military, meaning that the higher the ACOL, the less
likely the individual will leave the military. The SWOOP program is expected to
raise the value of ACOL, making staying in the military more attractive than
leaving immediately to an individual pondering a retention decision.
c. Demographic Variables
Several demographic factors are also included in the retention model
to capture differences in non-pecuniary factors affecting the separation decision.
These include the following.
(1) MARRIED is a dummy variable which indicates marital
status at 5 YOS. MARRIED = 1 if the individual is married and = if he is single
or divorced. Although the computation of the ACOL variable controls for
differences in military and civilian income streams by including BAQ, other
benefits such as health care for dependents may increase the probability that
married personnel will stay in the military. The coefficient of MARRIED is
expected to positively affect the decision to stay in the military.
(2) CHILDREN is a dummy variable constructed from the
DEP3 variable in the DMDC data set to indicate the presence of dependents in a
household other than a spouse at 5 YOS. CHILDREN = 1 signals the presence of
non-spousal dependents in a household and = means no additional dependents
are present. Prior research has shown that individuals prefer the relative security
of stable military pay over the more volatile civilian wage. Moreover, the military
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medical plan and other benefits are also found to decrease the probability of
leaving for an individual. The coefficient of CHILDREN is expected to have a
positive sign, indicating that the presence of children in a military serviceman's
household makes him less likely to leave the military.
(3) MINORITY is a dummy variable which controls for
racial and ethnic differences in the retention decision. MINORITY = 1 if the
individual has a non-Caucasian ethnic origin and = otherwise. The potential
civilian earnings of minorities tend to be restricted, but this is not captured by the
ACOL variable. Therefore, the average ACOL values would tend to be greater
than those of the Caucasian base case, resulting in a tendency to stay in the
military rather than leave. Thus, the coefficient of MINORITY is expected to
have a positive effect on the decision to stay in the military.
In summary, the specification of the probit model is displayed
below. The expected sign of each variable indicates the expectations about its
effect on the dependent variable, the probit indicator variable associated with
staying in the military:
+ + + +
Zstay = /(ACOL, MARRIED, CHILDREN, MINORITY) (12)
The ACOL computations for one model would include the bonus in
the calculation for military pay and would be used as a basis to evaluate the
marginal probability that an individual will stay in the military, i.e., the effect on
retention from the increased pay from the SWOCIP program.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. METHODS
This chapter describes the estimation methods utilized in this thesis and
also discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section B discusses the
findings on the simulated effect of the proposed SWOCIP program on the
voluntary retention behavior of SWOs. A multivariate probit model (Equation 15)
is estimated to determine the magnitude and the direction of the effect of the
independent variables discussed in Chapter HI on retention behavior. These
models use data on SWOs in year groups 1976 through 1978, tracking their active
duty status through YOS 11. Data for the three year groups were pooled into one
data set to provide a significant number of observations for analysis as well as
greater variability in the ACOL values. The effect of the program is estimated by
comparing the retention probabilities predicted by the probit model after
accounting for the change in the pay bonus, holding all other factors constant.
Section C provides a cost-benefit analysis of the program based on the
simulated program effect in Section B. The number of officer accessions needed
to meet the desired force structure is inversely related to the retention rate. An
increase in retention means fewer officers accessions will be needed, whereas a
drop in retention rates requires more commissions to meet required force levels
within the internal labor market of the Navy. Accession cost savings can be
compared to the cost of the bonus to determine the cost effectiveness of the
SWOCIP program. The key to program effectiveness is its effect on officer
retention.
This chapter also provides estimates of the marginal probabilities associated
with the explanatory variables in the probit models. Marginal effects can be
calculated by evaluating the probit models using the mean values of the
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independent variables. The marginal effect is the change in the probability of
staying in the military associated with a one unit change in a given explanatory
variable, holding all other variables constant (AR/AX). The elasticity is the
percentage change in the dependent variable for each percentage change in a
certain independent variable. The probability of staying in the military for the
average or "notional" person (i.e., a theoretical person whose values of the
independent variables were set at the respective mean values of the entire
population used for this model) are calculated to obtain the marginal probabilities.
Each continuous variable is changed by one unit from its mean value while
holding all other variables constant, thus obtaining a probability of staying for a
"new" individual. The value is changed from to 1 or from 1 to for dummy
variables, and the corresponding probability is calculated. The difference in the
two resulting probabilities is an approximation of the change in the probability of
the outcome (STAY) for a one unit change in the specific explanatory variable.
To determine whether or not the retention rates in the data file were
realistic, these rates were compared to rates compiled by BuPers-23 and those
predicted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) for the years 1996 through
2000. Table 4.1 displays the BuPers retention rates, Table 4.2 shows the CNA
projected rates, and Table 4.3 displays the rates from all three sources for
comparison. The DMDC data file appears to overestimate the retention rates for
year groups 1976 through 1978, as the rates typically run more than 10 points
higher than BuPers or CNA estimates. The higher probabilities in our probit
models might occur because the distribution of the sample is biased toward the
higher YOS cells and thus a higher retention rate. This in turn could also decrease
the anticipated effects of the SWOCIP program as the discounted increase in the
military pay stream may have less of a marginal influence upon retention behavior
at these more senior YOS points.
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Table 4.1. Annual Retention Rates for SWOs, Year Groups 1978 to 1994
byYOS
YG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
78 - - - - - - - - .921
79 - - - - - - - .890 .898
80 - - - - - - .866 .901 .931
81 - - - - - .861 .907 .890 .908
82 - - - - .867 .861 .891 .863 .92
83 - - - .849 .871 .863 .840 .903 .876
84 - - .914 .853 .831 .827 .851 .876 .899
85 - 1 .916 .792 .796 .839 .827 .818 .865
86 .846 .909 .780 .807 .840 .832 .748 .902
87 1 .916 .932 .767 .780 .782 .730 .824 .923
88 1 .900 .933 .732 .807 .801 .704 .864 -
89 1 .85 .857 .746 .806 .868 .840 - -
90 1 1 .921 .753 .817 .872 - - -
91 1 1 .899 .788 .869 - - - -
92 1 .875 .931 .874 - - - - -
93 1 1 .942 - - - - - -
94 1 .777 - - - - - - -
Ave. 1 .916 .915 .793 .825 .841 .829 .858 .904
Source: Derived by author from BuPers-23 data.
Table 4.2. Predicted Annual Retention Rates from FY96 to FY2000 by YOS
YOS 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rate 1 1 .894 .874 .777 .772 .856 .91 .93 .92
Source: Center for Naval Analyses.
Table 4.3. Comparison of Annual Retention Averages
Source YOS 6 YOS 7 YOS 8 YOS 9 YOS 10
Thesis/CNA .924 .956 .972 .987 .967
BuPers-23 .825 .841 .829 .858 .904
CNA .772 .856 .910 .930 .920
Source: Derived by author; data from respective sources.
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The average annual retention rate is lowest in the years immediately
following completion of MSR (YOS 6 and 7) as individuals who do not have a
high taste for military life elect to leave the military at the earliest opportunity in
order to benefit from the higher present value of wages in the civilian labor force.
The rate climbs through YOS 8 to 10 as the prospect of military retirement draws
nearer and the present value of expected military retirement pay rises.
B. EFFECT OF PROPOSED SWOCIP BONUS ON SWO RETENTION
BEHAVIOR
The results of the analysis of SWOs in year groups 1976 to 1978 with 6 to
10 YOS are included in this section. Before analyzing the retention behavior in a
multivariate model, the average ACOL values were examined as a preliminary
analysis of the relationship between ACOL and YOS. Table 4.4 shows that, for
the YOS included for this analysis, the mean ACOL values increase with YOS.
This can be explained by the increasing attractiveness of the military retirement
program with YOS. Additionally, the average ACOL values are similar to those in
prior retention studies (Rogge 1996).
Table 4.4. Average ACOL Values by YOS for Navy Officers in Year Groups
76-78, Bonus Taken at YOS 6 (to nearest whole dollar)3
YOS Observations ACOL ~~ACOL
Without Bonus With Bonus
6 3385 $ 72,592 $ 80,041
7 3129 74,100 77,484
8 2991 75,427 78,056
9 2907 76,640 78,680
10 2869 78,183 79,056
Aggregate 15,281 $ 75,276 $ 78,684
a
Real dollars (base year: 1990)
Source: Calculations by author, derived from DMDC CNA, and PUMS data.
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A multivariate probit model is used to determine the factors influencing the
retention behavior ofNavy SWOs in year groups 1976 through 1978. The variable
(STAY) represents a binary decision, to stay in the military or leave immediately.
This decision was modeled as a function of ACOL and the demographic variables
listed in equation (15) in Chapter HI.
Table 4.5 displays the estimated probit coefficients of the independent
variables, the significance level of each coefficient, and the calculated marginal
effects of each variable. The marginal effect represents the change in the
probability of staying for a one unit change in the respective explanatory variable
except for the ACOL variable. Since a major research question of this thesis is to
determine the effect of the SWOCIP program upon the voluntary retention rate, the
marginal effect of the ACOL variable was computed by calculating the difference
in the simulated probabilities of a "notional individual" with and without the
inclusion of the pay bonus in the ACOL calculation. This marginal effect is an
estimate of the effect of the SWOCIP program on the decision behavior of eligible
officers.
Table 4.5. Probit Regression Results of SWOs in Year Groups 76-78
Variable Coefficient Waldx2 Pr>X
2 AR/AXa
(Marginal Effect)
INTERCEPT -0.7916 5.9185 0.0150
ACOL 0.000026 39.8224 0.0001* 0.0108b
MARRIED 0.3995 99.4076 0.0001* 0.0506
CHILDREN 0.4074 58.9477 0.0001* 0.0440
MINORITY 0.0169 0.0941 0.7591 0.0022
Model chi-square = 177.033 with 4 DF (p=0.0001); n = 15281
a
change in probability of staying for a unit change in the independent variable, calculated at the
mean values.
b
change in probability of staying in the absence of the SWOCIP bonus, calculated at the mean
values.
significant at the .01 level of statistical significance
Source: See text.
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As expected, the ACOL variable was found to be statistically significant
and positive in its effect on the probability of staying in the military. Although the
value of the coefficient is small, it is similar to the estimated coefficients in Rogge
(1996) for VSI/SSB eligible officers, Reibel (1996) for naval aviators and Mairs et
al (1992) for Army officers.
The marginal effect for the ACOL variable, listed in column 5 of Table 4.5,
provides an estimate of the increase in the probability of staying in the absence of
a bonus. Mean values were computed for the rest of the variables and held
constant. The change in ACOL was based on the change in military pay due to the
SWOCIP program. The program increased the probability of staying in the
mihtary by 1.08 percentage points (1.16 percent) for the entire sample period
(YOS 6 to 10 years). This is far lower than the assumption made by Mackin and
Darling (1996) that SWO retention with a $10,000 annual bonus at YOS 5 would
produce the same retention increase as for nuclear officers under the NOIP
program (approximately 10.5 percent).
The DMDC baseline personnel data used in the ACOL analysis may also
overestimate the SWO retention rates. This is indicated by the large differences
between the rates calculated for the DMDC data set and both the BuPers and CNA
retention rates, shown in Table 4.3 above. Therefore, there may actually be lower
retention increases than the DMDC data indicate. It is unclear, however, what
effect this possible bias might have on the ACOL regression coefficients or the
calculated marginal probabilities. As discussed in the conclusions and
recommendations for future research, further analysis of this potential
measurement error is needed.
Marginal probabilities of the effects of ACOL on retention can also be
calculated for each of the individual decision points (i.e., each YOS) in the model
rather than for the entire 5-year period. Mean values for all variables were held
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constant (except the one for which marginal effects were being calculated) while
the value of the independent variable in question was changed from to 1. Table
4.6 summarizes the percentage change in retention and the associated pay
elasticity (%AR/%Apay) for each YOS. As the ACOL rises with each YOS, the
elasticity gradually decreases as the marginal effect of additional compensation
upon retention drops. As individuals progress in YOS, the increasing present
value of retirement benefits produces higher retention rates. The most significant
retention increase occurs in YOS 6, where the SWOCIP bonus created a 2.42
percentage point (2.62 percent) increase in retention. The combined effect of a 50
percent lump sum payment, totaling $25,000 during the first year of the bonus and
the low initial ACOL value combine to create a large percentage increase in ACOL
(10.5 percent). This sharp increase in the cost of leaving thus creates the largest
retention effect in YOS 6. The relatively low retention rates at YOS 6 contribute
to a higher estimated elasticity of ACOL, meaning that individuals are more
responsive to changes in compensation at this point. Consequently, the marginal
effect of additional pay is greater. As YOS increases, individuals realize a higher
present value in expected retirement benefits and normal retention rates climb.
Thus, additional compensation from the bonus has a decreasing marginal effect
upon retention.
As the bonus is assumed to be taken at YOS 6, the first year all officers can
make voluntary retention decisions, the greatest increase in retention obtained by
the bonus occurs at that YOS. Also, as discussed earlier, an individual receiving a
$50,000 bonus at YOS 6 receives an initial payment of $25,000 and four
subsequent payments of $6,250. As a result, there is the largest change in ACOL
for YOS 6. Therefore, YOS 6 is employed in the cost benefit analysis to evaluate
the SWOCIP program.
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6 .9475 .9233 .0242 2.62 .209
7 .9400 .9288 .0112 1.21 .200
8 .9418 .9333 .0085 0.91 .191
9 .9436 .9373 .0063 0.67 .185
10 .9447 .9421 .0026 0.28 .150
Overall .9436 .9328 .0108 1.16 .155
Column (1) and (2) computed by taking the standard normal of the probit standard indicator.
Column (3) is the difference between the probabilities computed in (1) and (2). Column (4) is the
percent change in the probability, or (4) divided by (1). Column (5) is the pay elasticity, calculated
by the percent change in retention by the percent change of discounted military pay from the
SWOCIP program bonus.
Source: Derived by author.
The elasticities in Table 4.6 are significantly lower than what might be
expected based on earlier studies of officer retention. Typically, elasticities in
prior studies fell between about .4 and 1.5. Again, the extremely high initial
retention rate in this data set makes changes in retention less responsive to changes
in compensation.
Table 4.7 shows the marginal effects of the demographic variables on the
voluntary retention rate of SWOs. The effect of minority status, MINORITY, has
a slightly positive effect on retention for this sample of SWOs, but the coefficient
is statistically insignificant. The percentage of minorities (8.74 percent) in this
sample closely resembles the percentage in the sample of officers in Rogge's
(1996) study of the VSI/SSB program (7.32 percent), and the estimated effect of
minority status is the same. For these samples, whether or not an individual is a
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minority had little bearing on the retention decision. Both studies contained
percentages of minorities which were far below the approximate proportion of
minorities in the general population (approximately 30 percent).
Table 4.7. Marginal Probabilities of Demographic Variables (Xi)
with Respect to Retention
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Xj = 1 Xj = Marginal Percent Change
Probability in Probability =
0)-(2) (3)/(D
MARRIED .8391 .9497 .0506 5.67
CHILDREN .9222 .9662 .0440 4.77
MINORITY .9328 .9350 .0022 .0024
Source: Derived by author.
Both of the remaining independent variables MARRIED and CHILDREN
are significant at the .01 level for the sample. Both coefficients are positive as
well, indicating that being married and having children both increase the likelihood
of remaining in the military. Since the ACOL variable incorporates differences
between civilian and military earnings conditioned on marital status, the positive
coefficient ofMARRIED suggests that married officers have a stronger preference
for military life. Additionally, fringe benefits (such as dependent health care)
seem to be valued more highly by married officers or officers with children than
by single officers. In fact, the medical health plan for military dependents is
believed to be the major reason for the higher retention of married officers and
officers with children. Holding all other things constant, being married results in
an increase in the percent who remain in the Navy of 5.06 percentage points (a
5.67 percent increase), and having children results in an increase in the percent
who stay of 4.4 percentage points (a 4.77 percent increase). These findings are
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consistent with the results in Bautista (1996) and Rogge (1996) in their studies on
officer retention rates.
C. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
This section explores the expected changes in manpower costs as a result of
implementation of the proposed SWOCIP program. To evaluate the economic
efficiency of the program's effects, a cost-benefit analysis is conducted where the
cost of initiating the SWOCIP program is compared to the benefits in the form of
reduced accessions needed to meet the desired end strength goal. The cost saving
from SWOs who are induced to stay in the military (and otherwise would have
left) is considered the benefit of the program. If the savings from the reduced
training and accession costs of SWOs who are induced to stay are greater than the
cost of the implementation of the bonus program, then the SWOCIP will be cost-
effective.
BuPers estimates the average cost of a SWO accession to be $48,000 per
ensign commissioned. This is computed by taking a weighted average of the costs
to train an officer candidate from each commissioning source: the Naval
Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School
(OCS). In addition to this pre-commissioning training, SWOs undergo additional
post-commission training at Surface Warfare Officer School Command
(SWOSCOLCOM, or commonly referred to as "SWOS") before reporting to their
first duty station. This training cost includes a direct cost per trainee of $11,200
and an indirect cost of $39,893 for each newly commissioned ensign for a total
average training cost of $51,093 per accession. The cost of SWOCIP program
implementation is simply $10,000 per year for 5 years, or $50,000 per participant;
more precisely, the cost is $25,000 for the first year and $6,250 for the next four.
Discounting this bonus by an approximate average of the OMB A94 (1992)
34
standard (4.5 percent) for cost-effectiveness analysis results in a cost to the
government of $47,422 per "taker."
The effect of the SWOCIP bonus on retention, as found in section B, can be
evaluated using FY2004 department head billet fill requirement projections. As
previously mentioned, BuPers predicts the officer billet fill requirement for
FY2004 to be 275 department heads. Using the more conservative retention rates
from CNA and BuPers, the predicted increase in the number of accessions
required to reach the desired number of personnel at the department head level
before implementation of the SWOCIP program can be determined. By
successively multiplying the target number of department heads (275) by the
inverse of each annual retention probability, the number of accessions necessary to
provide the required end strength can be obtained.
The number of required accessions of SWOs after implementation of the
SWOCIP program can be determined using the following procedure. One must
first increase annual retention rates for the years affected by the bonus by the
percent change in the probability before implementation of the program. Next,
begirining with the endstrength goal 275 surface warfare officers at YOS 10, one
applies the inverse of the retention rates that are applicable from YOS 6 to 10
when the SWOCIP program is in effect to determine the endstrength at YOS 6.
Then, at YOS 6, one uses the estimates of the percent change in probability of
accepting the bonus to determine the number who would take the bonus and the
associated number of surface warfare officers who would remain in the Navy
without the bonus. Finally, using the retention rates applicable to YOS 1 through
YOS 6, the number of accessions needed with the bonus are calculated.
Therefore, if one starts with the number of accessions and implements the bonus
program, one would obtain the needed 275 surface warfare officers at YOS 10.
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At the decision point, the number of personnel who accept the bonus can be
determined from the marginal effects of ACOL on retention; the increase in the
number of stayers can be considered the same as the number of program
participants. The marginal probability, the percentage point increase in the
probability of staying in the military, should not be mistakenly used for this
calculation because it is not proportional to the percent of officers who will take
the bonus. Once the participation is determined, the total SWOCIP program costs
can be determined and compared to the cost savings from reduced accessions.
The full costs and benefits of the SWOCIP program are likely to be much
more complex than the simple trade-off of reduced accessions versus the cost of
the bonus payments. Furthermore, billet accession costs entail much more than
evaluating the number of personnel needed at a particular point of service to meet
end strength goals. Force stmcturing involves attention to the entire shape of the
force, that is, the experience and skill structure of individuals for all years under
consideration. Factors such as demographics and morale are also accounted for
when making policy decisions. To evaluate the full costs and benefits of
programs, all these factors must be taken into account. Accordingly, this
comparison does not constitute a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the program.
However, exaniining the net benefit between accessions and bonus participants
does give a valuable partial indication of the additional accession and SWOCIP
program costs.
For simplicity, this analysis assumes that participants will only be offered
the bonus immediately at the end of their MSR. If officers could participate at any
time during the 5-year period, the number of required accessions would be even
further reduced. Although the largest increase in retention comes in YOS 6 with
the $25,000 lump sum, smaller increases in the retention rate occur for each
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throughout the 5 year bonus payment period. These changes result in the higher
retention rates displayed in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. SWO Retention Rates After Implementation of the
SWOCIP Program, Source by YOS























Source: Calculations by author from CNA and BuPers data.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis Using Bupers Retention Rates
Using the retention data from BuPers, the required number of SWO
accessions without a SWOCIP program bonus would be 928. With the bonus, 854
officers are needed. The 74 officer decrease in accessions saves $7,33,882 (74 X
$99,093). At YOS 6, the 2.62 percent increase in retention from the program
means that 16 of 582 officers will take the bonus, costing $758,752 in program
costs (16 X $47,422). The net benefit of the program from reduced accessions is
$6,754,130, indicating the program is cost-effective. This comparison of
accession savings and program costs is summarized in Table 4.9.















(5) (6) (7) (8)
Savings of # of Bonus Cost of Net Benefit
Accessions Participants SWOCIP = (5K7)
Costs Bonus
($)
2.62 928 854 -74 $7,332,882a 16 $758,752b $6,754,130
a
Calculated using BuPers figures of $99,093 per accession
b
Calculated using discounted value of bonus of $47,422 per participant
Source: Calculations by author, derived from BuPers-23 data.
37
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis Using CNA Projected Retention Rates
Using CNA's anticipated retention rates for FY1996 to FY2000, the
baseline number of surface warfare officer accessions required to reach 275
department heads at YOS 10 is 881 before implementation of the SWOCIP bonus.
If the bonus is implemented, only 812 officer accessions are required. The
difference in accessions of 69 officers saves $6,837,417. Of the 506 officers
eligible to take the bonus, 2.62 percent participate in the program, totaling 14
"takers." The program costs, therefore, are $663,908, resulting in a net benefit of
$6,203,509. Again, the SWOCIP program appears to be cost-effective. Table
4. 10 displays these results.
Table 4.10. Net Savings of SWOCIP Program for FY2004, Retention Rates
Calculated by Center for Naval Analyses





























2.62 881 812 -69 $6,837,417* 14 $633,908b $6,203,509
a
Calculated using BuPers figures of $99,093 per accession
b
Calculated using discounted value of bonus of $47,422 per participant
Source: Calculations by author, derived from CNA data.
It is interesting that in both calculations (Tables 4.9 and 4. 10) the reduction
in accessions is significantly greater than the number of bonus participants. The
explanation is that the SWOCIP program results in an increase in the retention rate
from YOS 6 through YOS 10. In other words, SWOCIP has two effects: it
increases the number of surface warfare officers at YOS 6 and also increases the
retention rates from YOS 6 through YOS 10.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis analyzed the effect of the monetary cost of leaving on the
voluntary separation behavior of mid-grade Navy surface warfare officers. The
analysis mainly focused on the changes in the number of officers who would
continue serving in the military after their minimum service requirement (MSR) if
a bonus were introduced. The utility maximization framework of occupational
decision-making and the Annualized Cost of Leaving Model were utilized to
specify retention models. Multivariate probit models were estimated to simulate
the marginal effects of the proposed Surface Warfare Officer Career Incentive Pay
(SWOCIP) program bonus on the retention decision via the ACOL variable.
Estimating the model for Navy surface warfare officers in year groups 1976, 1977,
and 1978 found that the proposed $50,000 bonus, with $25,000 paid in the first
year and $6,250 annually for the next four years, would increase the retention rate
in the year of service immediately following MSR by approximately 2.42
percentage points (2.62 percent). The effect would decline at a decreasing rate if
offered at each of the next four YOS points (YOS 7 through 10). Using these
figures with projected retention rates from BuPers, the program would cost
$758,752 and reap $7,332,882 million in savings for a net benefit of $6,574,130.
Using CNA retention projections, the program would save $6,837,714 in accession
costs while costing $633,908. The net benefit would be $6,203,509. Under both
scenarios, the program appeared to be cost-effective.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis provided an analysis of the SWOCIP bonus program on the
retention behavior of Navy surface warfare officers. The marginal effect of the
bonus program upon SWO retention behavior was evaluated using only the
39
anticipated FY2004 force structure requirement for 275 department heads at the
end of YOS 10. Additionally, the Navy may require a manning "floor" for surface
warfare officers at YOS 5 to meet division officer billet fill requirements.
Depending on the level of the floor, the acceptable minimum accessions could rise
to a level where a bonus might no longer be cost effective. Within the framework
of voluntary participation in the SWOCEP program, higher accessions coupled
with an excessive "take rate" could drastically lower the net benefit of a SWO
retention program. Future research should assess the requirement for billet floors
and investigate their effect on accession and retention policy.
This study and many others (Cylke, 1982 and Black, 1983) have assumed
that the personal discount rate is constant throughout one's term of military
service. This may not be the case. Numerous changes occur throughout a military
career, particularly for officers between YOS 5 and YOS 10. Approximately 40
percent of the officers who were single upon entry to the service will be married
before the end of the tenth year of service, and more than that will have some
change in their marital status (i.e., divorced, remarried, etc.). Young military
couples may also start their families during this period, incurring numerous
expenses ranging from health care to housing. This may tend to increase the
personal discount rate at the time the individual must decide whether or not to
accept the bonus, meaning that an individual would value a future dollar less than
before. On the other hand, the great responsibilities of family life may cause
greater fiscal responsibility over the long term as an individual plans for such
events as sending a child to college or buying a house in the future, making the
value of a future dollar greater than before and indicating a decrease in the
personal discount rate. Future research should study the typical change in the
personal discount rate over time and in relation to various demographic factors,
particularly marital status and number of dependents. Any change in the discount
rate will result in changes to compensation programs such as SWOCIP.
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Additional study is also needed to determine the typical economic rent for
the SWOCIP program. For example, the increase in retention as a result of the
program can be predicted from the model in this analysis. However, when a bonus
program is implemented, some who accept the bonus would typically have stayed
in the military without a bonus. In other words, a voluntary program may have a
higher participation rate than the empirically derived increase in retention because
individuals may take the bonus even if they would have stayed in the military
anyway. Better information is needed on the prospective take rate of a bonus,
perhaps through a survey ofjunior officers.
More research should also be conducted to determine the likely
participation rate of the bonus for surface warfare officers. A simple assumption
that the pay elasticity will be similar between surface warfare officers with nuclear
power training and convention SWOs fails to recognize that the culture of the two
communities may cause differences in how they each may respond to a given
compensation program. The calculated pay elasticity in this study (around
.2),
seemed quite low for surface warfare officers, but this might have resulted from
the high baseline retention rate in the CNA longitudinal data file. This suggests
that the size of the bonus may need to be higher for them than for other warfare
communities to produce the same increase in retention. Further research could
provide a more accurate estimate of pay the elasticity and participation rates to
provide the necessary information on the effects of a continuation bonus.
A non-quantifiable factor is that the bonus will, for the first time, place
conventional surface warfare officers on an equal footing with submarine, nuclear
surface, and aviation officers. This recognition of the value of surface officers
may contribute to a stronger community commitment. Whether this results in a
higher response rate than predicted by the ACOL model, however, is difficult to
predict.
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Better cohort data is also needed to provide analysts with accurate
information, particularly regarding retention data. The cohort data in the data file
provided by CNA appeared to overstate the true retention rate in the relevant YOS
cells. Many entries appeared to be missing, especially for the TIME_LOS variable
which pertained to the length of service. Further, the CNA retention rates taken
from the data were more than ten percentage points higher than data compiled by
BuPers. Cohort files which track the marital status of SWOs throughout their
career would also aid ACOL analysis. The lack of this information in the file
resulted in the use of assumed probabilities of becoming married, which assist in
computing the proper amount of BAQ in the discounted military pay stream but
give the model less explanatory value in describing the marginal effect of marital
status on the retention decision.
Other year groups or sets of year groups should also be examined for the
effect of the SWOCEP program on voluntary retention. Retention behavior could
differ between the sample used in this analysis (1976-78 year groups) and, for
example, a year group or set of year groups from the late 1980s. The retention
"climate" in the military and civilian employment opportunities might differ
markedly for the more recent year group. These factors may cause the bonus to
have a different effect upon the decision to stay in the military in the current
climate.
Other research should examine opportunities to reduce the number of
accessions. Other manpower reduction programs, such as "Smart Ship," may also
help to lower the required division officer floor or the required department head
fills. "Smart Ship" may enhance the performance of the SWOCIP program and
yield even greater economic benefits from potential reductions in accessions and
training costs.
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE ACOL PROCEDURE
This Appendix describes the steps required to calculate the value of the
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) variable for Navy Surface Warfare Officers.
Calculations for this warfare community are unique, especially in the computation of
military pay, because compensation varies according to YOS, marital status, and duty
status (i.e., sea duty or shore duty). ACOL analysis relies upon the assumption that the
maximum ACOL is the most critical; if this cost of leaving is not sufficient to deter an
individual from leaving the military, then lesser values can not be expected to dissuade an
individual either. Theoretically, to find the maximum ACOL value, one must evaluate its
value at all future decision points in a prospective career, considering all possible time
periods, or horizons. Warner and Goldberg (1984) point out that this rigor is frequently
unnecessary for military personnel because the nature of the military retirement system
causes the maximum ACOL to occur late in a career; at YOS 20, military personnel
become vested in the retirement system, which consists of approximately 50% of base
pay at the paygrade at the time of retirement. For this reason, a 20-year horizon is
assumed for each decision point. In this analysis, each decision point (e.g., each year
between 6 to 10 years of service) considered a 20-year horizon, meaning that pay streams
consisted of the sum of annually discounted pay values between 6 and 20, 7 and 20, etc.
Before ACOL analysis is conducted, the proper discount rate for the sample
should be chosen (see Chapter II for discussion). Based upon prior studies, the estimated
rate at which typical military officers discount future earnings is approximately 10
percent. This is the rate that determines the present value of future dollars. The cost of
leaving (COLi) is based on two pay streams: the returns to staying (RSi) and the returns
to leaving (RL; ) for an individual /, which in turn is annualized by dividing by (1+p)1 ,
where p is the personal discount rate.
1. Returns to Staying (RSi). In our example the returns to staying consist of
the summation of the present value of expected future military pay, expected military
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retirement pay, and discounted post-military civilian pay and discounted civilian
retirement pay.
a. Future military pay (MILPAYi ). The first step in calculating
future military pay is to acquire the appropriate military pay tables for monthly basic pay.
These can most easily be obtained from back-issues of the Navy Times or from the
"Manpower Costs" section of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report, published
annually by the Department of Defense. The correct pay table for the corresponding
decision point is the table for that year in which the decision is made. Therefore, since
each of the three year groups (1976, 1977, 1978) made decisions for the same YOS in
different calendar years, different pay tables must be used to compute the discounted
military pay stream at the same YOS for each year group. Career Sea Pay tables were
also obtained for the corresponding periods.
To determine the pay an individual can expect in future years, one
must determine the probability of being in a specific paygrade at each YOS, between,
say, 6 and 20 years. This was done by crosstabulating the YOS and paygrade variables in
an officer master file (OMF) provided by Defense Manpower for year groups between
FY77 and FY90. The average of the paygrade distributions are listed in Table 3.1 in the
text. The product of the probability of being in a given paygrade and the monthly basic
pay corresponding to the respective paygrade is the proportion of monthly basic pay from
that paygrade which contributes to the average, or expected, value of monthly basic pay
for that YOS.
Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) data are also present on the
military pay tables. This pay varies with marital status, which was only indicated at YOS
5 in the data set. In order to account for changes in marital status, probabilities of being
married by age were obtained from Current Population Reports published by the U.S.
Census Bureau. From these reports, the probability of marriage was calculated for each
YOS based upon the average age upon commissioning. If P(L) is the proportion of the
SWO community married at YOS=L, the probability of becoming married at YOS=L+l
can be approximated as (P(L+1)-P(L))/(1-P(L)). In this manner, percentages were
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obtained which were applied to the married BAQ and single BAQ values to determine the
expected BAQ in a given YOS.
Finally, Career Sea Pay was included in the value of MILPAY.
Since surface warfare officers only receive career sea pay when serving in an afloat
command, assumptions were made about a typical sea-shore duty rotation to determine
which YOS include sea pay in the discounted military pay stream. It was assumed that
this rotation from the years 1976 to 1978 was similar to the present officer duty rotation.
Therefore, YOS 6 and 7 were considered as simulated "shore duty," where no career sea
pay was added to the discounted military pay stream; YOS 8 through YOS 11 were
considered sea duty (department head tour) for SWOs, where sea pay was received; YOS
12 and 13 were considered shore duty, YOS 14 through 17 were considered sea duty, and
YOS 18 and 19 were considered shore duty. This special pay varies according to
paygrade, so the same paygrade probabilities (Table 3.1) were used to determine the
value of expected sea pay.
The three aforementioned monthly pay components were summed,
then multiplied by 12 to get the expected annual pay for a given YOS. In order to keep
all pay data in the same base year, nominal values for discounted military pay were
converted to real dollars with base year 1990 (for reasons to be discussed below) using
the Consumer Price Indices (CPI) with relation to 1990 for all pay tables.
Table A. 1 contains the real expected military pay values, discounted
by YOS and calculated present values for Navy officers in FY81. Column 1 indicates the
YOS, and column 2 contains the conversion ratio to real dollars (base year 1990).
Columns 3 and 4 show the values of expected military pay in real dollars for FY8 1 for
each YOS by marital status (s=single; m=married). Column 5 is the stream of discount
rates, which are applied in the Excel spreadsheet to the corresponding pay value for the
appropriate year of service. Column 6 is the discounted pay stream for single officers
from YOS 6 to YOS 20; the sum of this stream is shown at the bottom of column 6.
Column 7 is the same as column five except these values are for married officers.
Column 8 is for YOS 7, single officers, as the spreadsheet continues out to the right.
Table A.l contains only a small portion of the present value streams; the Excel
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spreadsheet continues to the right, calculating present values of military pay for years of
service 8 through 19. These present values are the value of the MILPAY variable used in
ACOL computations.
Table A.l. Present Value of Real Expected Military Pay, 1991, by YOS












































































1.948717 21154.94 21469.44 24028.08
2.143589 21843.71 22059.06 22908.37
2.357948 20825.79 21032.39 22442.39
2.593742 20402.17 20575.92 20478.13
2.853117 18616.49 18768.37 17941.67






s, yos 6 m, yos 6 s, yos 7
338552.4 344358.4 335159
Source: Calculations by author; data from Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Within the Excel Spreadsheet, the formulas used to sum the military
pay for a given marital status and YOS can be viewed on the formula bar when the cell is
highlighted. Expected cells are constructed in the following format:
(((a)+(b)+(c))*12)*cpi)
where (a) is the expected monthly basic pay value (calculated separate from the
spreadsheet), (b) is the expected monthly BAQ, and (c) is the expected monthly Career
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Sea Pay. These monthly values are multiplied by 12 to obtain the annual expected
military pay, then multiplied by the preceding column, the CPI inflation factor (base
1990).
b. Military Retirement Pay was assumed to be 50 percent of the
expected base pay, calculated with paygrade probabilities from Table 3.1 in Chapter EQ
for YOS 20. This is included with the civilian earnings in columns 2 and 3 in Table A.2,
which sums the expected mihtary retirement with expected discounted civilian pay and
discounted civilian retirement benefits to calculate the value of the discounted post-
military civilian earnings stream.
Table A.2. Present Value of Civilian Earnings Plus Military Retirement by i
and Marital Status after Retiring from the Military, Base Year IS




39 55717.12 60496.12 year discount 40, s, 19 40, m,19
40 56624.12 61534.12 1 1.1 51476.47 55940.11
41 57492.12 61529.12 2 1.21 50216.6 50850.51
42 58317.12 63474.12 3 1.331 46952.88 47689.04
43 59095.12 64366.12 4 1 .4641 43278.89 43962.92
44 59823.12 65199.12 5 1.61051 39849.29 40483.52
45 60495.12 65970.12 6 1.771561 36682.12 37238.41
46 61110.12 66674.12 7 1.948717 33700.43 34214.36
47 61664.12 67309.12 8 2.143589 30926.18 31400.2
48 62153.12 67870.12 9 2.357948 28347.13 28783.55
49 62576.12 68354.12 10 2.593742 25952.49 26353.47
50 62930.12 68759.12 11 2.853117 23731.91 24099.65
51 63212.12 69083.12 12 3.138428 21675.29 22012.01
52 63423.12 69323.12 13 3.452271 19772.81 20080.44
53 63559.12 69480.12 14 3.797498 18015.63 18296.29
54 63621.12 69551.12 15 4.177248 16394.46 16649.98
55 63608.12 69536.12 16 4.594973 14890.54 15133.08
56 63520.12 69436.12 17 5.05447 13517.52 13737.57
57 63359.12 69250.12 18 5.559917 12256.05 12455.24
58 63124.12 68981.12 19 6.115909 11098.92 11278.96
59 62817.12 68629.12 20 6.7275 10038.86 10201.28
60 62259.12 68197.12 21 7.40025 9064.663 9215.515
61 61993.12 67686.12 22 8.140275 8183.487 8314.967
62 61481.12 67099.12 23 8.954302 7375.553 7493.506
63 60906.12 66441.12 24 9.849733 6639.828 6745.474
64 60271.12 65713.12 25 10.83471 5970.63 6065.058
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Table A.2. Present Value of Civilian Earnings Plus Military Retirement by Age
and Marital Status after Retiring from the Military, Base Year 1990
(cont.)
65 59579.12 64920.12 26 11.91818 5330.636 5447.152
66 58834.12 64066.12 27 13.10999 4783.053 4886.815
67 58039.12 63156.12 28 14.42099 4287.201 4379.457
68 57198.12 62193.12 29 15.86309 3838.748 3920.617
69 56317.12 61183.12 30 17.4494 3433.811 3506.316
70 55398.12 60131.12 31 19.19434 3068.64 3132.752
71 54447.12 59040.12 32 21.11378 2739.725 2796.284
72 53467.12 57918.12 33 23.22515 2443.939 2493.767
73 52463.12 56768.12 34 25.54767 2178.234 2222.047
40, S, 19 40, m,19
618112.6 631480.3
Source: Calculations by author, data from PUMS.
c. Discounted Civilian Pay. The earnings stream after 20 YOS was
obtained using the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 1990 census. After
restricting the data set to veterans, 51,212 observations were used to estimate age-
earnings profiles using the equation (Rogge, 1996):
Ln (EARNS) = 7.7 + 0.1*AGE - 0.0009* AGE 2 + 0.14*MARPJED - 0.22*MILRET
+ 0.27*MALE (B.l)
where Ln(EARNS) is the natural log of the individual's civilian income, AGE is a
continuous variable, MALE and MARRIED are dummy variables, and MELRET is a
dummy variable coded = 1 if the veteran had 20 or more YOS and = otherwise. Since
these data were values in 1990 dollars, the discounted military pay streams were inflated
by their respective CPI (base 1990) to facilitate real dollar comparisons. This discounted
pay stream and the expected retirement pay were summed to compute CIVPAY, the
expected civilian earnings after retirement. Table A.2 displays these results for age 40.
These streams are computed for each potential retirement age contained in the CNA
subset.
2. Returns to Leaving was also derived using the PUMS, where earnings
were conditioned on age and marital status to obtain the present value of the civilian
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income stream if the individual left immediately to seek civilian employment. This is
compiled similarly to Tables A.l and A.2. These present values were assigned the
variable RL for ACOL calculations.
3. ACOL computation. After the paystreams have been developed, the cost
of leaving can be computed by taking the sum of MILPAY and CIVPAY and subtracting
RL. The resulting COL is annualized, then is divided by the number of years remaining
to the end of the horizon to obtain ACOL.
As an example, consider the value for a married officer with six years of
service in FY81, who was 20 years of age when he received his commission. His present
value of his expected military pay if he should stay in for until YOS 20 (MILPAY) can be
found in Table A. 1 at the bottom of column 7 ($334,358). The present value of his
expected earnings after he completes his military service (CIVPAY) can be found in
Table A.2 under the column corresponding to his retirement age (40) and marital status
($631,480). The sum of MILPAY and CIVPAY are his returns to staying (RS) if he
should stay until YOS 20, retire from the military, and work in the civilian sector until he
retires from his second career. In this case, RS = $334,358 + $631,480, or $965,838.
Similarly, his returns to leaving the military immediately (RL) can be found in a similar
Excel spreadsheet column ($393,354). Therefore, his cost of leaving (COL) in 1981 is
the difference between his returns to staying and his returns to leaving (RS - RL), or
$572,484. His annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) is obtained by dividing by the sum of
the discount factors (as shown in equation 4, Chapter II) to YOS 6, 8.103 in this case,
multiplied by the years remaining from the decision point to the horizon (13). For this
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